

Success and Failure of the British North Russia Intervention

Introduction

Some hundred years ago, Russian Civil War broke out. It ended with the establishment of the Soviet Union, the aftershocks of which are still felt today. Feeling threatened by this development the Allies, France and the United Kingdom, tried to prevent its inception by force. Developments in Russia once more raise an alarm in the Western World and some speak of intervention. Therefore it seems only reasonable to look at previous attempts of intervention. Perhaps to learn lessons from these attempts, or to dissuade oneself from these thoughts.

At first this essay will give a short overview of the Russian Civil War. This will be followed by a more in depth view of the North Russia Intervention. Afterwards the goals of the Intervention and the troops deployed for it, will be laid out. Then the campaign will be looked at more closely. A distinction will be made between the two theatres of operation. Finally success and failure of the campaign will be analysed. Reasons for both will be given as well.

One of the main question focused upon will be, in how far the North Russia Intervention was a success or failure. The second will be why the Intervention succeeded or failed.

Russian Civil War

In 1914 the Russian Empire joined the First World War on the side of its Allies, France and the United Kingdom. In fighting against the Central Powers, Russia suffered defeat after defeat. Losses of land, following the advance of the Central Powers, left the Russian population starving.¹ Rampant starvation left the population hostile to the government and the Tsar. Germany, confronted with renewed Allied offensives on the Western Front, aimed at knocking Russia

1 J. W. Long, *Civil War and Intervention in North Russia 1918–1920* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972). pp. 1–3.

out of the War. Capitalizing on the dissatisfied population, the Germans send such revolutionaries as Vladimir Lenin to Russia, hoping to force a revolution.²

The February Revolution, the first Russian revolution, happened in March 1917. For eight days, revolutionaries clashed with the Tsarist police. When the garrison forces in St Petersburg capitulated to the revolutionaries, the Tsar abdicated.³ His government was replaced by the Provisional Government of Alexander Kerensky. As the Kerensky Government failed settling the war with the Central Powers, its popularity decreased even further.⁴ This was followed by an aborted coup by General Lavr Kornilov. Thus popularity of the Bolshevik movement rose considerably, allowing Lenin to incite another revolution. This October Revolution succeeded in toppling the Provisional Government and replaced it with a Bolshevik government.⁵

As the Bolsheviks were backed by Germany, the Allies feared the conclusion of a separate peace with the Central Powers. To prevent this at first political pressure was applied.⁶ In the meantime Operation Faustschlag was attempted by the Central Powers. It seized a wide stripe of Russian territory between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. These losses forced the Bolsheviks to conclude the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, thus ending the First World War on the Eastern Front.⁷ This treaty posed a double threat. Firstly, Germany could now move its troops to the Western Front. Secondly, in seizing Finland from the Russians, they threatened Murmansk with its ports, and possibly Archangel with the Allied war material. Thus they decided to intervene militarily in Russia.⁸

2 D. Wright, *Churchill's Secret War with Lenin: British and Commonwealth Military Intervention in the Russian Civil War 1918–20* (Solihull, Helion & Company, 2017). pp. xvi–xviii.

3 N. Baron, *King of Karelia: Col P.J. Woods and the British Intervention in North Russia 1918–1919* (London, Francis Boutle Publishers, 2007). pp. 57–59.

4 Baron, *King of Karelia*. pp. 57–59.

5 Wright, *Churchill's Secret War with Lenin*. pp. xvi–xviii.

6 C. M. Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture* (Uckfield, Naval and Military Press, 2010). pp. 5–7.

7 Wright, *Churchill's Secret War with Lenin*. pp. xvi–xviii.

8 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 2–3.

North Russia Intervention

The North Russia Intervention was part of the greater Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War. It began on the 4th March 1918, the landing of the first British troops in Murmansk.⁹ It ended on the 12th October 1919, when the last British soldiers embarked there. This campaign played out in two theatres of operation, Murmansk and Archangel.¹⁰

The more important of these theatres was Archangel. It consisted of a vast flatland, occasionally split by rivers, most of which froze over in winter. The two main rivers, the Dvina and Vaga were the two lifelines of the area. Therefore control of these rivers was of great importance for the campaign.¹¹ The Archangel theatre was commanded by Major-General Frederick Poole. He was further appointed GOC-in-C North Russia Expeditionary Force. He was succeeded at Archangel, a year into his tenure, by Major-General Edmund Ironside.¹² He was in turn succeeded by General the Lord Rawlinson. But his appointment was aimed solely at overseeing the evacuation of all British troops from both theatres.¹³

The second theatre was the Murmansk theatre. Its main value lay in the northern ports of the Kola Peninsula, which would not freeze over in winter, thus making excellent submarine ports.¹⁴ The Murmansk theatre was commanded throughout the campaign by Major-General Sir Charles Maynard.¹⁵

Goals

In broad strokes the goals of the North Russia Intervention were to reconstitute the Eastern Front. If this were achieved, the Germans would be

9 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. p. 4.

10 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. p. 310.

11 W. E. Ironside, *Ironside: The Authorised Biography of Field Marshal Lord Ironside* (Stroud, The History Press, 2018). pp. 106–107.

12 W. E. Ironside, “Operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1 October 1918, to 11 August 1919”, *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4116–4118.

13 H. S. Rawlinson, “Decision of H.M. Government to withdraw British troops from, North Russia”, *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4118–4126.

14 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 8–9.

15 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 10–12.

unable to remove as many troops to support their Western Front.¹⁶ Furthermore if Germany were to prevail in Russia, the Allied blockade were negligible, as they would have access to the industry and resources of Russia.¹⁷ An intervention on ideological grounds was also favoured by certain politicians.¹⁸

At Archangel the main goal was to restore a White Russian government to combat Bolshevism.¹⁹ Preventing Allied war supplies, delivered to the Russians, from falling into German or Bolshevik hands, was also intended. At Murmansk a different goal was envisaged. Here access to the ice-free ports of the Kola Peninsula was to be denied to the Germans. Had they succeeded in capturing these, submarine-warfare in the Atlantic could threaten Allied shipping.²⁰ Furthermore the Murmansk-Petrograd railroad was to be secured against both Soviets and Germans.²¹

This put the Allies in a rather interesting situation. At Murmansk Allied forces were at first, to support the Bolsheviks as allies. At the same time in Archangel the Bolsheviks were the enemy.

Troops

The troops deployed on the North Russia Intervention became the North Russia Expeditionary Force. These were split between the Archangel and Murmansk theatres.

In the Archangel theatre troops were made up of 236th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Ironside.²² Additional troops formed a brigade-sized unit under Brig.-Gen. Sadleir-Jackson. This brigade contained 10th Battalion Royal Scots and 52nd Battalion Manchester Regiment. Troops

16 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 2–3.

17 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. p. 3.

18 Wright, *Churchill's Secret War with Lenin*. pp. xvi–xviii.

19 F. C. Poole, “Action of the North Russia Expeditionary Force from its inception on 24th May, 1918, up to 30th September, 1918”, *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4109–4110.

20 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. p. 8.

21 C. M. Maynard, “Operations carried out by the Allied and Russian Forces under my command in the Murmansk Region from 1st March, 1919”, *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. p. 4128.

22 Ironside, *Ironside*. pp. 103–105.

from the Canadian Field Artillery and Slavo-British Allied Legion further supported the brigade.²³

Allied forces at Archangel were made up of French and American troops. The French send about 2.000 colonial soldiers and a battalion of their Foreign Legion.²⁴ The Americans deployed a force consisting of a regiment of infantry, railroad and engineers companies and a field hospital.²⁵

In the Murmansk theatre troops made up two detachments. Firstly, 1st Company 29th London Regiment, 253rd Machine-gun Company and two Sections 584th Field Company Royal Engineers made up the Expeditionary Force under Brig.-Gen. Finlayson.²⁶ Secondly a Military Mission with the intention of training a White Russian force. These joined the 400 Royal Marines deployed to Murmansk in March 1918. Allied forces deployed, consisted of a battalion of Serbian infantry, some French artillery and several battalions of Italian infantry.²⁷

The Royal Navy contributed to both theatres 20 ships under command of Rear-Admiral Thomas Kemp. He was succeeded by Rear-Admiral Oliver Green.²⁸ These were made up of two seaplane-carriers and a number of river-monitors. The river-monitors formed the River Force and rendered support to the advancing infantry. They also deployed two Battalions Royal Marines Light Infantry.²⁹ The newly formed Royal Air Force deployed a small number of seaplanes and a single Sopwith Camel. The main purpose of these was reconnaissance.³⁰

By April 1919 a volunteer force was raised in England. This North Russia Relief Force was intended to defend the existing British positions in the

23 G. R. Singleton-Gates, *Bolos and Barishynas: Being an account of the doings of the Sadleir-Jackson Brigade and Altham Flotilla, on the North Dvina during the Summer 1919* (Aldershot, Gale & Polden, 1920). pp. 7–8.

24 J. W. Long, *Civil War and Intervention in North Russia 1918–1920* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972). pp. 197–199.

25 R. Albertson, *Fighting without a War: An Account of Military Intervention in North Russia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920). pp. 17–25.

26 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 12–16.

27 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 12–16.

28 Ironside, *Ironside*. pp. 106–108.

29 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. p. 55.

30 C. Boyer, *RAF Operations 1918–1938* (London, William Kimber & Co Ltd, 1988). p. 38.

Archangel theatre. Within weeks almost 3.500 people had volunteered. Terms of service specified, that volunteers may not be used for attacks.³¹

These Allied forces faced of against the Soviet Northern Front. This was made up of the 6th and 7th Armies as well as flotillas on the main rivers in the area. The 7th Army was made up of the Pskov Rifle Division and the 2nd Petrograd Infantry Division. These were supported by local partisans, as well as deserters and mutineers of the Allied armies.³²

Campaign

The North Russia Intervention was carried out around Murmansk and Archangel. Therefore the history of the campaign will be split between both theatres. As the Intervention began with landings at Murmansk, this theatre will first be focused on.

1. Murmansk Theatre

In early 1918 the Central Powers invaded Russia in Operation Faustschlag. Within eleven day the had conquered vast swathes of Land between the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland.³³ Realizing they could not stop this invasion on their own, the Soviets requested help from the Allies. Thus on the 4th of March 200 British Marines landed in Murmansk.³⁴ Throughout April and early May a joined force of Red Guards and the British Army skirmished with Finnish troops on their move South. On 10th May they succeeded in capturing the strategically important city of Pechenga.³⁵ The strategical importance of Pechenga lay in its port, which the Germans could have used as a submarine base in the Barents Sea. Spurred on by this success British forces were reinforced by 600 soldiers under Maj.-Gen. Maynard.³⁶

31 C. Kiving, *Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia 1918–1920* (London, Hambledon Continuum, 2006). pp. 191–193.

32 H. S. Rawlinson, "Decision of H.M. Government to withdraw British troops from, North Russia", *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. p. 4119.

33 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 6–7.

34 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 6–7.

35 C. M. Maynard, "Operations carried out by the Force under my command since its landing in Northern Russia, on 23rd June, 1918", *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. p. 4113.

36 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 23–28.

In the next months the Anglo-Soviet Relationship deteriorated continuously. Open hostilities between both sides were the result. These culminated in a Soviet attempt to capture the Murmansk-Petrograde Railway, which the British repelled.³⁷ Throughout autumn they were reinforced by French, Italian and Canadian soldiers, swelling their ranks to about 6.000 troops.³⁸ Following the Armistice on 11th November the Allied forces remained in Russia, their purpose changed.³⁹

Entrenched in Murmansk the Allies now attempted to re-establish a White government, if necessary by force. To this end the British raised and trained a White Russian army. Encumbered by a lack of recruits, a decision was made to advance South and conquer more populated areas.⁴⁰ During February 1919 Segeja was captured and the Allies advanced to Soroko and Olimpi, capturing up to 3.000 sq. mi. On 20th February the Soviets counterattacked.⁴¹ Fighting carried on till autumn, when in October the British tried a last offensive. The goal was to support White forces and cover the withdrawal.⁴² This last offensive was fraught with failure. An attempt by the Royal Scots to capture the village of Kandalaksha and stop Finnish Bolsheviks from sabotaging the retreat, was destroyed in an ambush on 9th October.⁴³ In late August Royal Marines trying to capture the village of Koikori, were repelled twice. A third attempt failed due to mutiny.⁴⁴

37 E. Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War* (New York, Pegasus Books, 2007). p. 91.

38 C. M. Maynard, "Operations carried out by the Force under my command since its landing in Northern Russia, on 23rd June, 1918", *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4112–4113.

39 C. M. Maynard, "Operations carried out by the Force under my command since its landing in Northern Russia, on 23rd June, 1918", *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. p. 4113.

40 F. C. Poole, "Action of the North Russia Expeditionary Force from its inception on 24th May, 1918, up to 30th September, 1918", *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4108–4109.

41 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 167–192.

42 C. M. Maynard, "Operations carried out by the Allied and Russian Forces under my command in the Murmansk Region from 1st March, 1919", *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4126–4130.

43 C. M. Maynard, "Operations carried out by the Allied and Russian Forces under my command in the Murmansk Region from 1st March, 1919", *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4129–4130.

44 C. M. Maynard, "Operations carried out by the Allied and Russian Forces under my command in the Murmansk Region from 1st March, 1919", *The London Gazette* (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4129–4130.

Defeated and slowed down by Bolshevik sabotage, the Allied forces withdrew to Murmansk. Following a mutiny of Royal Marines in June, they were embarked for home. The British forces there, all had left by 12th October.⁴⁵

2. Archangel Theatre

On 2nd August 1918 Tsarist forces in Archangel staged an uprising against the Soviet government there. This coup aided and abetted by the British, was coordinated by Maj.-Gen. Poole.⁴⁶ At the same time British and French troops were landed, supported by the Royal Navy. Having thus assumed control over Archangel, Poole declared martial law.⁴⁷ By September this joined force had advanced to the Dvina, Vaga and Onega Rivers. Having secured his base of operations, Poole pushed southwards.⁴⁸ There his forces captured the city of Obozerskaya, supported by bombers of the Royal Air Force. By 4th September Pooles force was joined by about 4.500 American soldiers.⁴⁹

Between September and October Allied forces began an advance along the Northern Dvina, the Allied army fighting on the riverbanks, the River Force rendering naval support.⁵⁰ The furthest advanced Allied forces captured the village Seletskoe.⁵¹ After the Dvina froze in late autumn, the Soviets began to counterattack. On 11th November both sides clashed in the Battle of Tulgas. Only on 14th November was this Soviet advance successfully blocked.⁵² Having been pushed back, the Allied forces dug in to defensive positions.⁵³

45 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 301–310.

46 J. W. Long, *Civil War and Intervention in North Russia 1918–1920* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972). pp. 200–203.

47 Ironside, *Ironside*. pp. 107–109.

48 W. E. Ironside, “*Operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1 October 1918, to 11 August 1919*“, The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4116–4118.

49 J. W. Long, *Civil War and Intervention in North Russia 1918–1920* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972). pp. 232–233.

50 W. E. Ironside, “*Operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1 October 1918, to 11 August 1919*“, The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4116–4118.

51 H. S. Rawlinson, “*Decision of H.M. Government to withdraw British troops from, North Russia*“, The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. p. 4119.

52 W. E. Ironside, “*Operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1 October 1918, to 11 August 1919*“, The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4116–4118.

53 Ironside, *Ironside*. pp. 115–118.

In late January 1919 fighting resumed. At the Vaga, British forces where expelled from Shenkursk, losing the railway-line.⁵⁴ By March the banks of the Vaga were lost and the River Force evacuated. Along the Dvina a second battle was fought at Tulgas on 26th January. During this battle the city changed hands several times, resulting in an Allied victory.⁵⁵ In April a further offensive southward was attempted by a joined British and White force. On 25th May White forces mutinied and surrendered Tulgas to the Soviets. The British and Canadians succeeded in recapturing the city once more.⁵⁶ By early June the British forces were ordered home.⁵⁷

In spite of this, the North Russia Relief Force was ordered the capture the city of Kotlas. It was a last attempted, to link the North Russia Expeditionary Force and the British forces in Siberia. The attempt failed due to the withdrawal of the British and White forces.⁵⁸ In June there were three large White mutinies. The biggest happened at Onega on 20th July and surrendered the city to the Soviets. After Onega the British lost their stores, the overland route to Archangel and Murmansk, and all trust in the Whites.⁵⁹

As cover for their retreat a last advance along the Dvina was attempted. They succeeded in capturing a few villages and Onega was finally recaptured on the 10th September.⁶⁰ At 6th September the British began to embark from Archangel. By 27th September all British troops were evacuated.⁶¹

54 W. E. Ironside, "Operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1 October 1918, to 11 August 1919", The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4116–4118.

55 W. E. Ironside, "Operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1 October 1918, to 11 August 1919", The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4116–4118.

56 R. Albertson, *Fighting without a War: An Account of Military Intervention in North Russia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920). p. 53.

57 Ironside, *Ironside*. pp. 127–129.

58 C. Kiving, *Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia 1918–1920* (London, Hambledon Continuum, 2006). pp. 191–193.

59 W. E. Ironside, "Operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 1 October 1918, to 11 August 1919", The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4116–4118.

60 W. E. Ironside, "Operations carried out by the Allied Forces under my Command during the period from 11 August 1919, to 27 September 1919", The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4130–4131.

61 H. S. Rawlinson, "Decision of H.M. Government to withdraw British troops from, North Russia", The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4118–4126.

Success and Failure

Achievement of the goals, set out for the North Russia Intervention, was varied. On one hand, some goals were achieved temporarily, others permanently. On the other hand, the majority of aims was not achieved. Thus it can be said, that the North Russia Intervention was overall a failure.

1. Success

At Murmansk the capture of the ice-free ports through the Germans was prevented. This was the only goal of the campaign, which was achieved permanently. The second goal, the control of the Murmansk-Petrograde railroad, was only achieved temporarily. In June 1918 a Soviet attempt to capture the railroad was repelled. By September 1919 the railroad was taken over by Red Finnish saboteurs.⁶² Thus the Allied withdrawal was obstructed.

At Archangel, a temporary White Russian provisional government was established. The coup d'état preceding this, was lead by the Tsarist Captain Georgi Chaplin. As Chaplin was a staff officer of Maj.-Gen. Poole, this undermined the legitimacy of the provisional government. This government prevailed until the American contingent withdrew in February 1920.⁶³ Secondly, the Allied war supplies stored, were denied to the Soviets due to the British landing in August 1918. Parts of these supplies were destroyed throughout the campaign by saboteurs, others were handed out to the White Russian army.⁶⁴ The majority of war supplies ended in Soviet hands. Reasons included: deserters; the mutinies of entire units, for example Onega on 20th July 1919; or the capture of cities and outpost by the Red Army.

62 C. M. Maynard, "*Operations carried out by the Allied and Russian Forces under my command in the Murmansk Region from 1st March, 1919*", The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4129–4130.

63 R. Albertson, *Fighting without a War: An Account of Military Intervention in North Russia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920). pp. 55–58.

64 F. C. Poole, "*Action of the North Russia Expeditionary Force from its inception on 24th May, 1918, up to 30th September, 1918*", The London Gazette (Supplement), No. 31850, 2 April 1920. pp. 4107–4111.

2. Failure

Overall the North Russia Intervention did not achieve its aims. The Eastern Front was not re-established. Neither was a permanent White Russian government established, nor were the industry and resources of Russia denied to Germany.

In February 1918 the German Imperial Army carried out Operation Faustschlag. Within two weeks, the German Army captured a stripe several hundred miles wide and reaching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Such a tremendous loss of arable land and industry forced Russia to concede to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Therefore the war on the Eastern Front was ended. With Russia embroiled in civil war and Germany focused elsewhere, the Eastern Front could not be re-established. As the Allies now had to concentrate on saving Russia from Bolshevism.

Similarly Operation Faustschlag gave Germany access to the vast resources of Russia. In capturing Ukraine first and foremost, they now controlled the Russian breadbasket. At least for a short time, this allowed Germany to mitigate the Allied blockade of its ports. Inevitably allowing them to drag on the war for another few months.

Any attempt to install a permanent White Russian government failed. At Murmansk a local Soviet ruled, although it sided with the Allies from July 1918 onwards. At Archangel the local Soviet was removed from power, shortly before Maj.-Gen. Pooles landing. As a result a provisional White government was set up. This governments authority was spread with the Allied advance along the Dvina and Vaga. With the end of 1918, the Bolsheviks began substantial counterattacks, resulting in diminished territory. Although this government carried on until 1920. In February of that year, the Bolsheviks conquered Archangel and removed the White government.

Conclusion

The goals set out for the North Russia Intervention, certainly were ambitious. Only few aims could be achieved and those temporarily. Based on

the situation at the beginning, the Intervention was necessary. Throughout the campaign planning posed one of the greatest problems. Supplies were inadequate and even the number of troops allotted, paled in comparison to those of the enemy. Over all that throned the greatest problem of all, the adverse weather. Therefore it might be concluded, that the North Russia Intervention was a failure, albeit not a complete one.

This failure can be attributed to several reasons. These range from matters of planning, logistics, weather and many others. On the most relevant of these, a short overview shall be given.

One of the main adversaries of the Allied forces was the weather. The winter 1917–18 delayed the British landings at Archangel by several months. The port of Archangel having been frozen over until August 1918. This further complicated landings of further supplies, as September and October saw the port freeze over again.⁶⁵ In 1919 the port unfroze only in June and July. As there were insufficient icebreakers, transit to and fro was hampered considerably. The weather also thwarted the Allied advance along the Dvina and Vaga rivers. They ere frozen over by October 1918 rendering naval support from the British River Force impossible.⁶⁶ Aided by the freezing over of the rivers, the Bolsheviks began to counterattack, throwing the Allies back 30 miles on the Archangel front.

A further problem was the planning of the North Russia Intervention. Maj.-Gen. Maynard at Murmansk was allotted numerous barrels of Norwegian salted herring as an alternative currency. Yet nobody had any idea, how these were to be transported to Murmansk.⁶⁷ Also 150.000£ were issued to the expeditionary force, but were not to be touched.⁶⁸ A further 12.000.000. Roubles were put at their disposal but were useless, as they bore the Romanov coat of arms and the year 1918.⁶⁹ Supplies could be landed for short times of the year at Archangel, having to be landed at Murmansk the remainder of the

65 Ironside, *Ironside*. pp. 106–111.

66 Ironside, *Ironside*. pp. 106–111.

67 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. p. 17.

68 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. pp. 153–155.

69 Maynard, *The Murmansk Venture*. p. 156.

year and transported by train through unsafe territory. Even billeting was a problem. The American troops landing at Murmansk, found their billets occupied by the British garrison.⁷⁰

A combination of these factors led to numerous mutinies and desertions. As the campaign was off to a good start, desertion and mutiny only afflicted the White Russians.⁷¹ April 1919 saw several mutinies, not only of the Whites but also of British troops (Royal Marines and Yorkshire Regiment).⁷² July 1919 saw three White mutinies, constituting the greatest loss of territory and supplies during the entire campaign.⁷³

Therefore it can be concluded that the North Russia Intervention failed in achieving its aims.

70 A. Bisno, “USS Olympia and the Russian Civil War: The Allied Intervention at Archangel and Murmansk in 1918”, URL: <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/browse-by-topic/heritage/usn-lessons-learned/archangel-murmansk.html> (2 February 2022).

71 R. Albertson, *Fighting without a War: An Account of Military Intervention in North Russia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920). p. 91.

72 R. Albertson, *Fighting without a War: An Account of Military Intervention in North Russia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920). p. 91.

73 R. Albertson, *Fighting without a War: An Account of Military Intervention in North Russia* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920). p. 94.

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Excluding footnotes and the bibliography, the total word count of this essay is 3175.

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